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"POLICY" IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. Henry M. Wriston-
at the Naval War College 
May 23, 1950 
Occasionally it is desirable to take the mind off the instant 
problem · in order. to consider broader and more general questions ; 
the current puzzle is sometimes easier to solve after it is looked at 
in a longer perspective. When this is done successfully it changes 
the scale of daily events and makes it possible to view them with 
more detachment and see them in their relationship to values which 
are permanent. 
In an attempt to do something of that kind I wish to discuss 
what we really mean by "policy" in foreign affairs. At the outset 
we are faced with a problem in semantics. The language of 
diplomacy, at least until the Russians revised international manners, 
has been formal in style and notable for understatement. It is not 
infrequently equivocal in expression. The reason. is simple: anyone 
executing diplomatic maneuvers must have in mind the possibility 
of failure and must prepare in advance a way of retreat in order to 
save face; if prestige is maintained, it is possible to return to the 
encounter when arguments have been refurbished, military and 
other dispositions re-arranged, and when the chances of success are 
· more favorable.
In dealing with basic policy, however, "diplomatic" language 
should never be used. Meaning should be crystal clear; therefore, 
policy is best expressed in naked terms. An illustration from domes­
tic life will clarify the point. When nullification threatened the 
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Union, President Jackson reduced fundamental policy to a brief 
phrase in his classic toast: "The Federal Union:. it must be pre­
served.'' That was a definition of the problem in terms so clear, so 
explicit, and so simple that it was impossible to· confuse the issue. 
When adjustment, which had been tried earlier in the Mis­
souri Compromise and was tried again in 1850, failed to resolve the 
conflict and the States were brought to the verge of war, Lincoln re­
stated the Jacksonian policy in language equally clear and perhaps 
even more explicit. In a letter to Horace Greeley he wrote: "If I 
could save the Union withoutJreeing any slaves, I would do it; and 
if I could do it by freeing all the slaves!, I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also 
do that." 
He succeeded, in those few words, in separating the central 
issue-the preservation of the Union__:from the confusing emotional 
tensions arising frotn the problem of slavery. . In the Second In­
augural he again re-stated the issue with such matchless clarity that 
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote his father, our Minister in Lon­
don: "That rail-splitting lawyer is one of the wonders of the day . .. 
This inaugural strikes me in the grand simplicity and directness as 
being for all time the historical keynote of this war." 
It is one of the major tragedies of our time that no such lucid 
summary of the meaning of the recent world war has come from 
any statesman. It is a measure of our confusion that it is asserted 
from time to time that no such valid and clear pronouncement could 
be made because of the incoherence which the Russian alliance· 
brought in its train. This is not true. If one has any grasp of 
historical fact, it must be clear that the Russian -alliance brought no 
more complications than the slavery issue brought to the War be­
tween the States. Lincoln was able to put in words which a child 
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could understand the reason for war. In similar fashion the basic 
policy beneath American participation in both world wars of the 
20th century is just as simple; any schoolboy could grasp it. It is, 
explicitly, that the interests of the United States are so world-wide 
that it could n0t permit any aggressor nation to control the whole 
continent of Europe-or for that matter Asia. 
That is the complete and adequate explanation of our par­
ticipation in both wars. It is also the complete and adequate ex-
planation of our delay in entering both wars. Our basic interest is 
real and vital, but it is neither so immediate nor so vital as the like 
interests of Britain and France. As long as there was reasonable 
basis for the belief that Britain and France could win alone, or with 
moral and material help from us, or assistance short of force, there 
was adequate reason to al;>stain from fighting: When it became 
clear that the risk of their defeat was too great and, therefore, 
our own policy was genuinely imperiled, we went in. It is not nec­
essary to assert that the timing was accurate in either case. The 
point is that delay in participation was� not irrational. As funda­
mental policy explains our entrance into the world wars, it equally 
explains our part in the "cold war"; the fact that victory in two 
world wars did not avoid the cold war does not invalidate the 
reasoning. 
When one looks at foreign policies, therefore, there are 
many which can be put in phrases just as clear and just as brief· 
as the Jacksonian policy with reference to the Federal Union. The 
classical British doctrine, the Balance of Power, illustrates the 
point. Our twin policies of the Open Door in China and the in­
tegrity of China are other illustrations. If one reflects upon those 
fundamentals with which we are concerned this morning, it will be 
perfectly obvious that they can be more effectively implemented 
and more successfully carried out when they are reduced to plain, 
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naval war with France and the War of 1812 with Britain. But it 
could not emerge as a very significant policy until all the world 
recognized us as a. world power, and it could not become a funda­
mental policy until we were recognized as the Western power­
the anchor man in that power group. 
We have the- same sort of fundamental policy with regard 
to Asia. Of course, we had no basic Asiatic policy for many years 
because we did not face the Pacific and Asia was not a factor in 
world affairs., But once we touched the Pacific it is extraordinary 
how speedily men who have no claims to great statesmanship per­
ceived the reality of our interest in that continent. Thus as Asia 
came into the focus · of international aff'airs and as we rose to the 
stature of a world power, the policy of no single dominant power 
in Europe had to be matched by a policy of no dominant power in 
Asia. It found expression in two classical phrases-the Open Door 
in China, that is resistance to economic imperialism, and the In­
tegrity of China, or resistance to political imperialism. 
It is essential to recognize the extraordinary stability of 
basic policy. The ebb and flow of circumstances over those un­
derlying realities must occasion many tactical maneuvers in the 
effort to make policy effective, but that does not mean a new policy. 
The Integrity of China, for example, is still valid. It has suffered 
many vicissitudes. As a policy it was never fully achieved; but, if 
one understands its fundamental character and appreciates how long 
it was in maturing, it becomes · equally clear that it is not yet com­
pletely, or permanently, defeated. Its current eclipse is nothing to 
be happy about, but neither is it anything to despair over. 
Thus when we draw policy into its time perspective it be­
comes clear that most so-called "new'' policies are transient; that 
is because they violate a third quality which a fundamental policy 
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should have. It should be not only clear and stable, but free of 
passion and emotion; it ought to be a strictly intellectual construct 
framed from real and permanent interests and utterly devoid of 
heat. Of course, once it has come to definition and its status is 
determined it may be, in fact it must be, def ended with fervor. But 
what Jackson showed in his toast and Lincoln demonstrated in the 
War between the states, Washington had defined in his Farewell 
Address; he emphasized the objectivity of proper policy when he . 
spoke against "passionate attachments" and "inveterate an­
tipathies." 
Thus the so-:ealled "Morgenthau policy" for Germany was, 
it seems to me, not a policy at all; it was just a reaction under · 
emotional stress; it overlooked geography, mcperience, tlie talents 
of a people, strategical concepts, and the psychology of both Ger­
mans and Americans. It was, therefore, transient. 
It was also disastrous, because it exemplified a characteris­
tic modern error-.:the belief that the opposite of som�thing bad __ 
must be somethng good, which is not true. By destroying not only 
German dominance but German power completely, protection is not 
achieved; it may lead, as the Morgenthau proposal did, to a power 
vacuum and thus draw in another nation (in this instance Russia) 
until it tl}reatens to replace the beaten nation as the dominant force 
in Europe. The consequence may be a situation no less intolerable 
than that which was overcome by war. 
The policy of destroying all German power-economic, pol­
itical, and military-was emotionally oriented. The war checked 
Fascis� and Nazism, but the exhaustion of .the West offered to 
Russia an opportunity to attempt something which was contrary 
to our interest. Only slowly did realization dawn that an emotional 
response was likely to def eat our own policy by making us think 
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of Germany in negative terms only and misconceive Russia in posi­
tive terms, often sentimentally. This attitude can be summed up 
in the phrase, "Good old Joe," now happily relegated to the realm 
of myth. 
In the fourth place we should remember that the word 
"policy" should be reserved for the things which are fundamental 
and continuous and should not be applied to devices and tactics, 
however important they may be. -- It is a mistake, for example, to 
refer to the Marshall Plan as basic policy. It is an extraordinary 
important operation, but nonetheless essentially a tactical device 
in support of our basic policy of preventing a single aggressive power 
from encompassing Europe. It is, therefore, a means to a larger 
end. It is, as we know, a transient means, for, by its own terms, 
it is to end in 1952. It has all the elements of ingeniousness that 
any brilliant tactical maneuver should have; it involves the con­
structive use of economic power to buy time for the re-creation and 
re-organization of forces likely to hold Russia in check. Its success 
or failure must be judged upon those considerations. 
It certainly has bought time. I do not think anyone seri­
ously believes that the Italian Government would be constituted 
as it is today without the Marshall Plan or that the Greek Govern­
ment would be constituted as it is today but for Marshall aid. There 
is now before us a novel and bold suggestion-the Schuman pro­
posal for the integration of the coal and steel industries of France 
and Germany. That proposal would have been incredible if either 
DeGaulle or the Communists had been in contro.l of France. If the 
Third Force had not been perpetuated in power by external support, 
that dramatic program for strengthening the economic defenses of 
Western Europe would never have been proposed. 
Whether progress toward the re-organization of Europe is 
complete enough or swift enough is a matter of judgment. Current 
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spicuous by its absence in China. We, therefore, had no channel 
through which our policy could flow. General Wedmeyer also came 
to that conclusion and said, in effect, that if we wanted to be sure 
to stop the Reds we must supply the personnel and make the full 
commitments; otherwise we must let nature take its course for a 
time because he saw no hope of making an effective instrument of 
Chiang Kai-shek. 
Somewhat the same problem has confronted us in Greece; 
we have had to work with what is there. The letter, which Am­
bassador Grady wrote to the Premier of Greece on the first of 
April, makes it clear that what we have had to work with in that 
country is. not very good; he made a bold and tactically dangerous 
move to. improve it. This is what he said: "The effort to make 
Greece self-sustaining and independent of foreign aid .... has 
hardly begun . . . . An important reason for the · delay has been a 
less than satisfactory performance by the Greek Government in its 
conduct of economic affairs. Only twenty-seven months remain in 
which the Greek Government may take advantage of the American 
aid made available through the Marshall Plan. This short time 
permits no further delay . . . . The American people, however, are 
entitled to expect, and do expect, that any Greek Government 
which hopes to continue to receive the aid which they have gen­
erously offered, will utilize this assistance to the fullest degree. 
"In my opinion, only a stable and efficient Government SUP­
ported by the people and by Parliament will be able to act with 
courage and the firmness of long-term policy which are essential 
to the wise use of the aid offered by the American people. Irre­
sponsible talk of adjourning Parliament or of new elections before 
th.e new Parliament has had an opportunity to rise to its responsi­
bility, can only create a climate of political and economic uncer­
tainty which may do grave damage to the country's future .... 
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Only a Government which can secure and . maintain public confi­
dence by its boldness and by its devotion to the public interest can 
be expected to execute the reconstruction stage of Greek recovery. 
We earnestly hope the Greek Government will meet this challenge 
. . . . It is in the hands of the Greek Government and the Greek 
Parliament to decide whether or not they wish to continue to re­
ceive American aid and hence to accept the responsibilities which 
will attain its purpose. It is .the obligation and intention of the 
American Government with regard to all Marshall aid countries to 
decide whether or not the performance of the recipient Govern­
ment, whether Greek or any/ other, justifies a continuance of the 
aid on the scale heretofore contemplated." 
When one has read the letter and realizes that it is usually 
bad tactics to interfere so openly in · the domestic politics of a· 
foreign nation, both the boldness and the dangerousnes,s of the 
mo've become clear. It suggests the situation was so serious that 
only a drastic remedy was worth trying. It also highlights how a 
sound· and necessary policy may fail temporarily ( and the word · 
"temporarily" must sometimes be given a very flexible interpre­
tation) for want of adequate, cooperating partners. 
The sixth aspect of basic policy in this review is that suc­
cess or failure at any given moment is affected by the quality of 
our own management. Americans in times past were proud of our 
"shirt-sleeves diplomacy," which in some circumstances was well 
adapted and worked satisfactorily, and in other circumstances was 
hopelessly bad. There have been at times amazing deftness and 
finesse, great perception and skill, and at other times, stupidity 
and lack of stamina. 
As a sound strategic concept can fail for want of energy 
ari.d for many other reasons, so a policy which is entirely valid 
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can be under-played, as the Monroe Doctrine was from time to time 
when we were not alert enough in the defense of its principles; 
it can be over-played, also, as Olney did in the Venezuela case. 
Neither the under-playing nor the over-playing affects the valid­
ity of the basic concept. The Monroe Doctrine does not represent 
a geographic reality, for the Western Hemisphere, except physi­
cally, is pretty much a myth. Certainly it is not culturally valid. 
Nonetheless politically it is sound, and even the failure of Latin 
America to develop along the democratic lines that the Anglo­
Saxons believe are correct, while it causes difficulties, does not 
make the fundamental concept less valid. It must be said that so 
far as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned our successive Secretaries 
of State, since we became a world power, have adapted themselves 
to the changing scene. 
In the seventh place, success of a basic policy does not hang 
upon dramatic or critical events. We have practically worn out 
the word "crisis" in our time. Modern means of communication 
and other factors have led us to over-dramatize the daily event 
and to hide the fact that indirect results are often more important 
than the immediate result. As George F. Kennan suggested recent­
ly in his notable speech in Milwaukee, sometimes five or ten years 
elapse between cause and effect in major foreign policy develop­
ments. The true meaning emerges only after the sense of crisis 
has subsided. 
Hitler offers a dramatic example: he told his men that on 
their arms rested "the fate of the German nation for the next 
thousand years." That was nonsense, because it made transient 
circumstances appear too decisive over too long a period. Already 
we can see that the German nation, though defeated, is now so 
essential to both competing power blocs that we may again see a 
repetition of what has happened so often before in history: over 
RESTRICTED 11 
11
Wriston: "Policy" in Foreign Affairs
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
a considerable period of time the defeated nation may profit more 
in defeat than it would have profited if it had won the victory. 
Hitler's error suggests a common failing. Right now over­
dramatization of current events leads us to expect too much of 
diplomatic conferences. It.is complained, for example, that the Big 
Three communique issued week before last sounded very much like . · 
the one issued nearly a year before. That ought not to be re­
garded as necessarily bad. It may well reflect steadiness of pur� 
pose, not a mere rushing from one hunch to another. 
/ 
In 1880 one of our basic policies was crystallized by Presi-
dent Hayes, when he said that, "The policy of this country is a 
canal under American control . . . . An inter-oceanic canal across 
·the American Isthmus will essentially change the geographical re­
lations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United
States .... It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our· 
.... shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United 
States." 
The last phrase sums it UP-the canal as "part of the 
coast line of the United States." That was as explicit as a policy 
could be made. Few people could now tell with any precision why 
· that statement came just when ,it did; the crisis which precipitated
the pronouncement has faded. The policy, so plainly and forcefully
stated, remains. It ran counter to the terms of the Clayton.
Bulwer treaty and Hayes' comment was in a sense an announcement.
of the fact and a prediction that the treaty would not survi.ve. the
pursuit of American policy.
Over the years that policy could have been implemeJJted by 
any number of actions. At one extreme would have been the an­
nexation of everything within that "coast line." There was a 
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strong drift in that direction for some time. The statement of 
Olney that our "fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines 
its interposition" was in harmony with such an idea. The Platt 
Amendment. for Cuba and tlre putting of armed forces into Haiti, 
Santo Domtngo, Nicaragua, and other countries might have 
eventuated in military, political, and economic control. At the 
other extreme, while the basic policy of regarding the canal as 
part .of our coast line remains unchanged, · all our relations with 
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean have been.put upon the 
bases of mutuality, with some_ accent upon United States leader­
ship, to a degree which Olney's tactics would never have led one 
to expect as within the realm of possibility. In short, a shift in 
tactics from time to time seen in too short a perspective looks like 
a shift in policy, when in reality it does not involve 1:Juch a de­
velopment. 
This consideration leads to the eighth point. · One of the 
central i1:Jsues of recent discussion is bipartisanism. Basic policies 
are non-political. That is more accurate than saying bi-partisan. I 
think Senator· Vandenberg recently called- them "un-partisan," 
which correctly expresses the point. The Monroe Doctrine, the 
Panama Canal as our coast line, Canada as within our defense 
system resistance to. control of Europe or Asia by a single power­
all these policies would be the same whether the administration were 
Republican or Democratic. 
On the other hand, the tactical dispositions adopted to 
achieve the policies are subject to politics, and properly so. It is 
the essence of the democratic system that action by the party in 
power is carried on under the scrutiny and criticism of the.minority. 
In England this -is epitomized by the phrase, "His Majesty's loyal 
opposition." It is revealed in our government by the fraternaliza­
tion across the aisle at one moment and the tension· between the 
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two sides at the next. The opposition almost always has to take 
a somewhat negative attitude because it does not have access to all 
the current dispatches and information necessary for constructive 
judgment. But even when criticis� is negative, it may well force 
those in power to act carefully. It can be vigorous and occasionally 
may be violent, but should be at all costs responsible. When we 
see political opposition in this light, we realize that it is not to be 
deprecated, but encouraged; that is the only way in a democratic 
society by which the public can hear both sides of every question 
and reach a considered consensus. 
In times of crisis when there is imminent and serious 
danger, opposition is mitigated. That has been true of the so­
called "Truman Doctrine" with regard to Greece and Turkey, true in 
connection with the Berlin air lift and the Marshall Plan. N onthe­
less, if the mitigation of opposition is long continued and not 
limited to matters under dangerous tension, it leads to a tendency 
to regard all opposition as improper. That feeling is far more 
dangerous in many respects than even violent opposition because 
it cuts at the root of the responsibility of the majority party and 
- destroys the foundations for an informed public opinion.
Consideration of policy in these broader terms indicates in 
the ninth place that it must be judged dynamically, rather than by 
any static method of estimation. One recent proposal is that we 
draw up a balance sheet to show our assets and liabilities and learn 
whether or not we are over-extended. It is not ari apt analogy, 
because policy is never fully reflected in a balance sheet-even 
industrial policy. By its nature the momentum, which is inherent 
in the activity of -any organization, is not shown. In some of our 
greatest corporations, the balance sheet has an item: patents, one 
dollar. If the patents were really worth one dollar, the organization 
would be bankrupt. If the company did not have the patents, it 
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would not be in business. That dollar is merely a symbolic figure; 
it is an indication that the value of the patents cannot be esti­
mated. 
Anyone who has been on an investment committee knows 
that the balance sheet does not adequately reflect the kind of man­
agement the company has. The enterprise may be solvent, but 
stagnant; management may be vital, but unwise. Those consid­
erations could well be concealed, rather than revealed, on a balance 
sheet. Moreover, the balance sheet, by its very nature, isolates 
. the company. It does not show it in relationship to its competitors 
or to those cooperating with it. But an industrial company does 
not live in isolation any more than a nation does. Therefore, while 
a balance sheet has certain obvious merits, as a basis for estimation 
of policy it may be quite misleading. 
Let us take, for example, the Monroe Doctrine; on any bal­
ance-sheet theory it would never have been drafted by so stern a 
realist as John Quincy Adams nor uttered by so seasoned a political 
leader as James Monroe. There were timorous people who felt at 
the time that we were over-extending our commitments. They 
wanted us at least to concert our action with Britain; but John 
Quincy Adams, one of our really great Secretaries of State, said that 
he was unwilling the United States should come in �s "a cockboat 
in the wake of the British man-of-war." He could read with amuse­
ment, not untinged with irritation, the bombastic words of George 
Canning, "I called the New World into existence to redress the bal­
ance of the Old," because he knew that statement was not true. 
The policy involved in the Monroe Doctrine has been chal­
lenged many times and by many powers-Britain, France, and 
Germany among others-but we were seldom alone in its defense. 
It is not historically accurate to say that it rested upon the power 
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of the British navy. From time to time it did so depend to some 
extent, but at other times it challenged the power of the British 
navy. 
What the balance-sheet technique would conceal is that, when 
at various times the issue was drawn, there was almost always 
some nation with an interest which was parallel to our own over a 
short or middle-length period, and that we could count upon assist­
ance, direct or indirect. It was not even necessary that our inter­
ests should coincide with those of the cooperating power in Latin 
America; support might mean no more than a common desire to op­
pose the threatening power for wholly different reasons; the ef­
fect was to lend help to our policy at the moment of crisis. But 
even beyond such assistance there is a fact of first importance, 
namely that we always had a greater interest in the preservation of 
the Monroe Doctrine than anyone else could have in challenging it. 
This leads to the final characteristic of basic policy: not all 
policies, not even all basic policies, have the same order of magni­
tude or equal priority. We would defend the policy of the Panama 
Canal as part of our coast line before we would make war to avoid 
dominance of Asia by a single power. Similarly, we mitigated our 
support of the Monroe Doctrine in the course of the Civil War be­
cause the indissolubility of the Union took priority over the main­
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine. The balance-sheet technique con­
ceals the fact that our commitments are not uniform over the 
whole area of policy and, more particularly, that they are not uni­
form at any given moment. Moreover, not all the policies of a nation 
are challenged at the same moment. For this reason it is never 
necessary to exert all the nation's power behind every policy at one 
time ; they tend to be successively challenged-not all at once. 
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Other nations, some of whose policies parallel our own, may 
have, indeed must have, different priorities. That no one power 
should dominate Europe is American policy; it is also British 
policy and French policy. Inevitably it has a higher priority in the 
British and French hierarchy of policy than in ours. The same 
reasoning applies to aid to Greece and Turkey. Because they were 
on her life-line, Britain's interest was more immediate and direct 
than ours. Our interest in them was a subsidiary of our determina­
tion to let no nation dominate Europe. Only when Britain notified 
us that she could not bear the w�ight, and when the Russian threat 
was immediate and serious, did we take over the leadership. 
Today there is no direct threat to the Canal as part of our 
coast line, no challenge to Canada as within our defense system, no 
infringement of the Monroe Doctrine; today it is our policy of no 
one dominant nation over all Europe or Asia that is being chal­
lenged. That fact accounts for the notable shift in our tactical dis­
positions, in new political emphases, and in dramatic economic man­
euvers; but it does not in any way mean the abandonment of other 
policies, nor does it mean that we are over-committed, because 
while there is a very heavy threat in one area, there is virtual 
absence of challenge in others. 
The purpose of this review of the underlying considerations 
in foreign policy is to lift our sights from the daily and immediate, 
the complex and the confusing. It is designed to help us look at 
the broader significance which time and analysis can reveal. The 
seriousness of the current situation is abundantly clear. We do not 
want even a tactical reverse. Nevertheless no one ever achieves all 
his objectives; whether we like it or not we must expect some re­
verses because our opponent is strong, resourceful, and determined. 
The recent temper of Americans has been one of reacton from the 
stimulation of victory; it may well have moved from the over-optim-
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ism that followed triumph to an unwarranted pessimism. Judgment 
will be sounder if is founded upon a long-range view. 
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